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EC NEWSLETTER FOR CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
REI,ATIONS WITII TIIE EUROPEAT{ I,JNION
IIUDRID SUMMIT DECIDES ENI.ARGEMENT
PROCEDURE
"Ihe European Unlon hopcs that the prellmlnary stage of
negotlatlons will colncide wtth the stalt of negotlatlon wlth
Cyanrs and Malta'.
This phrase, which appeared on Saturday afternoon in the
final Presidency Conclusions to the Madrid European Summit 15-
16 December, made the whole difference. It is not yet a binding
commitment but the general conclusions drawn by observers
present in Madrid were that this is a politicd commitment which
may not be left unfulfi[ed. The new wording was largely a result
of a fundamental debate between the EU Heads of Government
and their counterparts from nine associated countries during
Saturda/s lunch and a roughly one hour formal meeting. Malta
and Cyprus participated in these discussions as well.
The state of decisions on the nel( enlargement, as pre-
sentedbyCarlos Westendorpduring hiseveningbriefing onFriday
15 December,was practicallyidentical as thatoutlined in detailby
"Together in Europe" on 1 December (c.f. No79, pp1-3). The
principal difference was that what many estimated as our unrea-
sonably optimistic reading of the 3 reports (concerning the en-
largement and its impact on policies), as well as of the Reflection
Group's report to be presented to the Madrid Summit has mean'
while tr4nspired to be the actual content, firstly of the draft
Presidency Conclusions and then of the final conclusions.
The Madrid Summit re-confirmed that the "Enlargement
is both a political necessity and a historic opportunity for Europe".
It then stressed the "absolute i4:ntity of treatment between the
candidate countries". In the next step it outlined a mechanism
rvhich would dlow it to be objectively decided in late 1997, whcn
the necotiations will start with.
* ihe Commission has not only to present the Opinions on
\ individual candidate countries (and the EU Council to asses them
- 
- and draw the appropriate conclusion), but the Commission has
. . also to come with other general rePort(s)' the Presidency Conclu-
I r r sions to Madrid speak about a composite paper on enlar3ement-
-\l whici will evaluate the effects of enlargement on Community
\ policies. This paper will deal with all."oda"te countries and
I f shall ensure that the applicant countries are treated on an equal\J basis.
(cottinudorge2)
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(see wse l^"procedure is expected to finish relatively and the continued activities of the European Invest-
soon after the successful conclusion of the IGC, so it
shall allow the Council at the earliest opportunity to
take the decision for launching the accession negotia-
tions. Various ideas suggested in Madrid generally
indicated that in the absence of major complications
this timetable could indeed allow the simultaneous
beginning of negotiations with Malta and Cyprus.
Rather unclear is the next requirement that the
Commission also presents immediately after the
IGC, a communications on the future financial
framework of the Union after 1999 and with rrgard
to the prospect of enlargement. The question is
whether the decision by the Council to give the go-
ahead for enlargement could be made only on the
base of the discussion of the Commission's "commu-
nication", or whether they would force some ad-
vanced negotiations on a future linancial perspective
andwell ahead of these negotiations scheduledtime-
table. The latter case could easily imply some sigrrifi-
cant delays.
It also may be expected that at least 6 of 10
candidate countries from central and eastern Europe
will concentrate their diplomatic activity durin 91996
and early 1997 on persuadingthe EU Heads of State
to accept that the preliminary stage of negotiations
should start with all applicants.
The following article brings the exact wording
of part of the Presidency Conclusions of the Madrid
Summit dealing with Enlargement.
ENLARGEMENT
Enlargement isboth apolitical necessityand a
historic opportunity for Europe. It will ensure the
stability and security of the continent and will thus
offer both the applicant States and the current
members of the Union new prospects for economic
growth and general well-being. Enlargement must
serve to strengthen the building of Europe in obser-
vance of the acquis communautaire which includes
the common policies.
With that in mind, the European Council took
note of the Commission reports on the effects of
enlargement on the policies of the European Union,
on alternative strategies in agriculture and on the
progress of the pre-accession strateg;r for the associ-
ated countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
The European Council takes note of the
Council report on relations with the associated
CCEE during the second half of 195.
The PFIARE programme, as supportedbythe
European Council's decisions at its Cannes meeting,
ment Bank will allow an overall increase in the input
for accession preparations.
The European Council reiterates that the
accession negotiations with Malta and Clprus will
commence, on thebasis of the Commissionproposals,
six months after the conclusion of the 1996 Inter-
governmental Conference, and will take its results
into account. It is pleased that structured dialogue
with both countries began in July 1995 within the
framework of the pre-accession strategy.
The European Council also conlirms the need
to make sound preparation for enlargement on the
basis of the criteria established in Copenhagen and in
the context of the pre-accession strategy defined in
Essen for the CCEE; that strategy will have to be
intensified in order to create the conditions for the
gradual, harmonious integration of those States,
particularly through the development of the market
economy, the adjustment of their administrative
structures and the creation of a stable economic and
monetary environment
The European Council calls upon the Com-
mission to take its evaluation of the effects of enlarge-
ment on Community policies further, particularly
with regard to agricultural and structural policies.
The European Union will continue its review at its
next meetings on the basis of reports from the Com-
mission.
It asks the Commission to expedite prepara-
tionofits opinionson the applications madeso that
they can be forwarded to the Council as soon as
possible after the conclusion of the [ntergovernmen-
tal Conference, and to embark upon preparation of a
composite paper on enlargement. This procedure will
ensure that the applicant countries are treated on an
equal basis.
It also calls upon the Commission to undertake
adetailed analysis as soonas possible of the European
Union's financing system in order to submit, immedi-
ately after the conclusion of the lntergovernmental
Conference, a communication on the future financial
framework of the Union as from 31 December 1999,
having regard to the prospect of enlargement.
Following the conclusion of the Intergovern-
mental Conference and in the light of its outcome and
of all the opinions and reports from the Commission
referred to above, the Council will, at the earliest
opportunity, take the necessary decisions for launch-
ing the accession negotiations.
The European Council hopes that the prelimi-
nary stage of negotiations will coincide with the start
of negotiations with Cyprus and Malta. r
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THE INTERGOWRNMENTAL CONFERENCE WILL BE IATINCHED ON 29 MARCH IN
TTIR/[{ . THE REPORT OF THE RtrIECTION GRilN IS A "SOI]ND fuISIS" FORTIIE
WORKOF THE IGC
The Madtid European Council &cided ihat the Interyovemmental
Conference on the revision of the Maastricht Treaty will open in Tuiry on
29 March 1996, As far as the level of that meaingis conceme4 the summit's
conclusions just sq thot the Europeu Council'lakcs noteof ihe intention
of ihe forthcoming ltalian Presidcncy to adopt measures for
prepaing the Conference". In Madtid the issue povolccd a mlher livety
debate between ltolian Pime Minister Lantbeno Dini who wished the IGC
to be opened by the EU heods of State and govemment, and French
Presidcnt lacEtes Chirac, who feared that an droordinary European
Council would create "great expectations" atnong public opiniory while the
meetingwould have no decisions to make. To that, the ltalians oaswered
that, if by the end of Matrh the Foreign Affain Ministen are notbe able to
dccide on a clear mandate for the IGC, ihe Europeu Council will have
indeed somethingto decidc. And Felipe Gonzolezhoped that the problem
will be settled 'by the time the ltalian Presidency issues the invitations",
since "allthe otherc agreed".lacEtes Chirac, thouglt" saidthoton29 March
netd year he will be "at the other end of the world".
Another issue which was not Mr Westendorp, who finds that the
settled in Madrid, mainly because best formula for associatingthe EP
of the reservations of France and wouldbetheoneusedintheReflec-
the UK was the question of the tion Group on the IGC chaired by
European Parliament's association himself, where two Members of
to the work of thc IGC. Immedi- Parliament participated to the dis-
ately after the summit, European cussion,in"aspiritofpragmatism".
Parliament's President Klaus Some heads of government
Hiinsch said that he expected the (andalsoPresidentSanter)stressed
EU Foreign Affairs Ministers to that society as a whole should have
decide as ofnefi January that the aword to say, but most found that
EPwouldhaveanobserverstatusat Swedish Prime Minister Mr
theConference.Thesummit'scon- Carlsson's idea to consult NGOs
clusions simply state that the EP during the Conference went a bit
'trill be closely associated with the too far. Such a question can be
work of the Conference so that it is solved at national leve[ following
both briefed regularly and in detail each Member State's traditions and
on the progress of the discussions habits, said Felipe Gontalez
andcangiveitspointofview,where Atthe Madrid summit, the
it considers this necessary, on all headsofStateandgovernmentdid
matters under discussion". Ger- not discuss about the substance of
manChancellor Kohl stronglycon- the IGC, but at their informal chat
firmed his position in favour of after dinner, on Friday, Chancellor
Parliament's participation in the Kohl wondered about the way the
IGC, and Spanish Secretary of European Commission is presently
State, Carlos Westendorp, admit- run, mentioning the behaviour of
ted that there wac disagreement some Commissioners (such as the
among the Fifteen on this issue. unauthorized publication of the
Some said it would be "better to controversial "diar/' of Danish
have the enemy within", declared Commissioner Ritt Bjerregaard).
And President Santer, while
stressing that governments, and
not the Commission's President
appoint the Commissioners, told
the press that he had the intentioq
during the IGC, to make sugges-
tions precisely about the proce-
dures for appointing Commis-
sioners and about the authority of
the president himself on the whole
college (the tradition has been
until now that the President is a
"primus inter pares").
The procedural decisions
made in Madrid broadly set the
scene for the 19*i IGC, but don't
mention the date when the Con-
ference might'end. Everybody,
though, seems to imply that the
Conference might last about a
year, and finish in the first six
months of. L997, under Dutch
presidency (will the Treaty, then,
be a "Maastricht 2", as Chancellor
Kohl often calls it?). Carlos
Westendorp, referring to the next
British general elections, which
haveto take place in Spring t997 at
the latest, admitted that it is "not
very realistic" to assume that a
Government which has problems
with its "anti-European opinion
"should have" the same peace of
mind as others for concluding the
IGC'"
In Madrid, the European
Council decided that, after its
launching in March 1996, the
Conference will meet in principle
onoe a month, at the level of For-
eign Affairs Ministers, while a
working group made of a repre-
sentative of each Foreign Minis-
ter and of the President of the
Commission will be in charge of
the necessary preparations (on
former similar occasions, these
(corrtirrud onmc 4)
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representatives have been the Per-
manent Representatives of Mem-
ber States). The Madrid su-mit
also decided that Central and East-
ern European countries which
have European agreements with
the EU, as well as applicant coun-
tries Cyprus and Malta, will be
regularly briefed on the IGC, and
will be able to give their own points
of view at meetings with the
Council's Presidency which will be
held in principle every two months.
As far as the content of the
negotiations is concerned, the
European Council considered that
"the guidelines distilled" within the
Reflection Group chaired by Car-
los Westendorp, "following a thor-
ough analysis of the internal and
external challenges facing the Un-
ion and the possible responses,
constitute a sound basis for the
work of the Conference". The
heads of State and government
think that the IGC "will, in general,
have to examine the improvements
which will have to be made to the
Treaties to bring the Union into
line with today's realities and
tomorrow's requirements, in the
light of the outcome of the Reflec-
tion Group's proceedings".
The Reflection Group's 'Strategr
for Europe'
The Reflection Group, ac-
tually, did not have a negotiating
function, and was mainly asked to
identify the issues that the IGC will
absolutely have to handle, and to
suggest options.As far asthe analy-
sis of the situation is concerned,
agreement among the Group's
members was quite easy, but views
widely differed on the solutions,
reflecting the different European
vision of national governments.
Indeed, though in principle inde-
pendent, the representatives of the
fifteen Foreign Affairs Ministers
were to a large extent Secretaries of
State for Foreign or European af-
fairs, while the Commission was
represented by Commissioner
Marcelino Oreja and the European
Parliament by French Socialist
Elisabeth Guigou and German
Christian Democrat Elmar Brok.
Ms Guigou and Mr Brok contrib-
uted very actively to the debate,
making concrete suggestions
which, as Elisabeth Guigou said,
often became the opinion of a
majority in the Group. In fact,
though there was no unanimity on
any substantial issue, large majori-
ties emerged on several major ele-
ments of the future reform, includ-
ing the institutional issues. There-
fore, the report often speaks of the
opinion of "many of us", as op-
posed to "one of us" (British Min-
ister David Davis, who kept a con-
sistently minimalist stand during
the whole process).
Thus, the Group issued a
long report (more than forty pages)
called " An annotated Agenda",
full of options that the IGC itself
will probably deal with, and a
shorter introduction called "A
Strategy for Europe", which
stresses a few major points, and in
particular the need to "explain
clearly to our citizens why the Un-
ion, which is so attractive to others
in Europe, remains necessary for us
too". One of the main pieces of his
"strategli' is "the most ambitious
target" of the Union, its enlarge-
ment to the East and to Cyprus and
Malta. For the Reflection Group,
"the next enlargement provides a
great opportunity for the political
reunification of Europe. Not onlyis
it a political imperative for us, but it
represents the best option for the
stability of the continent and for the
economic advancement not just of
the applicant countries but for this
Europe of ours as a whole". The
report admits that "that enlarge-
ment is not an easy exercise", that
"its impact upon the development
of the Union's policies will have to
be assessed", and that it will "re-
quire efforts both by applicants and
present Union members that will
have to be equitably shared". The
next enlargement is "also a chal-
lenge", says the report, adding:
"We must do it, butwe have to doit
well".
The Reflection Group,
while stressing the meaning of this
"challenge", also notes that the
1996 tGC is "just one step" in a
whole process, and reminds that the
Maastricht Treaty already foresees
that a Conference should be con-
vened in 1996 "with a limited
scope". This scope, though, has
been "enlarged" at various Euro-
pean Councils, and the Reflection
Group states in particular that the
heads of State and government
have "identified the need to make
institutional reforms as a central
issue of the Conference, in order to
improve the efficiency, democracy
and transparency of the Union".
The Group thinks that, at the IGC,
"resultats should be achieved in
three main areas", which are:
making Europe more relevant to its
citizens, enabling the Union to
work better and preparing it for
enlargement, and giving the Union
greater capacityfor external action.
The idea of openness and of
promoting European values runs
through the whole report, but the
most concrete suggestions made by
in this area several members didn't
get the unanimous support of the
Group: these suggestions are, for
example, that the Treaty should
proclaim equalitybetween men and
women, non-discrimination on
grounds of race, religion , sexual
preference, age or disability, or that
the Social Agreement must "be-
come part of Union lau/' (but "one
of us believes that this would only
serve to reduce competitiveness",
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says the report, without mention-
ing David Davis).
The report also stresses
that the Union must "preserve its
decision-making ability after fur-
ther enlargement", and that this"
will mean changes to the structure
and workings of the institutions",
and "may also mean that flexible
solutions will have to be found,
fully respecting the single institu-
tional framework and the 
'acquis
communautaire"'. The Refl ection
Group stresses in particular the
need to maintain for each Mem-
ber States "fair representation in
each of the institutions", and to
simph& decision-making proce-
dures and enhancing the role of
the European Parliament. But it
admits that "one member believes,
however, that the European Parlia-
ment gained ortensive new powers at
Maastricht and therefore should
growinto these powersbefore seek-
ing moro". In general, all the
Group's members also admit that
national Parliaments should be
more involved in the European inte-
gration proces$$, but France go
further and suggest 1trs selting up of
new institutions (without getting
much support from the other mem-
bers). Another controversial issue is,
and will be at the IGC itself, the
wergbting of votes in the Council:
some "big" countries wish the sys-
tem to take into account the size of
the populations more, but smaller
countries resist this suggestion more
fiercely, and stress that a change
mrght be acceptable only if
the "supranational" EU institu-
tioq the European Commission,
is not threatened, and if eac.h
Member State retains one
Commissioner.
Meanwhile, ahead of the
convening of the IGC, Member
States have started putting out
papers on their priorities, in order
to have a discussion at the national
level first, in particular with
their own Parliament. Obviously,
the Maastricht's ratification diffi-
culties have taught governments
a lesson, and everyone will try
in the next months to involve
both Parliaments and public
opinion. t
THE CIULLENGES OF ENI./IRGEMENT
"Ihe next enlatgement rcprtsents both a
potitical lmperative and a nerv opportunlty for Eu.
ropc, but at the same time it presents the Unlon wlth
a mqlorchallenge rcqulring an adequatc response.'
This is how the Reflection Group's long-awaited
report on reform to pave the way for enlargement
begins its chapter on the challenges of enlargement.
The following "Together in Europe" will re-
view the principle ideas included by the Reflection
Group's Report and more or less directly related to
the ne:( enlargement.
The ne:d enlargement constitutes a resg)Irse
to the challenges of security and political and eco-
nomic stability in Europe. However, in order to
achieve it, reforms of the Union are required in some
areas, and, very significantlS ln the Union's lnstltu-
tlons. Furthermore, the report stresses that the
mec,hanisms for maintaining solidarity and cohesion
within the Union must be adapted and reinforced.
This is all necessary, the Group feels, if the Confer-
ence wants to endorse and reinforce the Union's
common objectiveswhich aim at peace and freedom,
internal and e:rternal security, democracy, protection
of the human rights an prosperity for the citizens of
Europe and solidarity between them.
The Conference must reaffirm the common
principleg namelythe maintenance and development
of the acquis communautaire. The report warns
against the prevention of flexible formulae from
being found on a case-by-case basis and encourages,
whert necessar?, new states ofintegration to be en-
tercd upon at diffenent paces, without the obJectlves of
a common proJect belngJeopardtzed ln any clncum-
stances. In order to achieve this the report underlines
the need for the consolidation of a single lnstltutlonal
framework as the best guarantee for the consistency of
the Union's action.
On the basis of the above, the prospect of
enlargement and the existence in the Union of differ-
entiated integration arrangements, raises the ques-
tlon of ltexibility and its limits in relation to the
outcome ofthe Conference and the approach adopted
to enlargement. If in answer to the question what do
the individual member states wish to accomplish to-
gether, the report stresses, that if a common will is
found to be lacking then this should not prevent those
who wish to see the Union progress ft6m dsing so ,
albeit subject to clear limits. It will have to be consld-
ened on a case-by-case basis, allowing flexibilitywith-
out jeopardizing the "acquis" and the common objec-
tives. With this the Group rtjects any fonnula whlch
could lead to an a la carte Europe. A large majority are
of the viewpoint that:
- flexibility should be allowed only when it
serves the Union's objectives and if all other solutions
have been ruled out and on a case-by case basis;
- differences in the degree ofintegration should
be temporary (cotrtiMoogc6)
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- no-one who so desires and fulfils the neces-
sary conditions previously adopted by all can be ex-
cluded from full participation in a given action or
common policy;
- provision should be made for ad hoc measures
to assist those who want to take part in a given action
or policy but are temporarily unable to do so;
- when allowing flexibility the necessary adjust-
ments have to be made to maintain the "acquis" and
a common basis should be preserved to prevent any
sort of retreat from common principles and objec-
tives;
- a single institutional framework has to be
respected, irrespective of the structure of the Treaty.
Several members, while in accordance with the
above, believe however that such flexible arrange-
ments in the Union should only be possible when
agreed by all, as in the past. Some members believe
that, whereas such arrangements should in principle
be temporary they need not always be so, especially
where they do not concern "core disciplines" of the
EC.
Degrees of flexibility are different according to
the three pillars and the present Member States and
those acceding on next enlargement:
- Whereas derogation must not be allowed in
the Community "pillar" if they jeopardize the internal
market and create discriminatory conditions for
competitiveness, CFSP and some Justice and Home
Affairs issues enable a greater degree of flexibility.
- The formulae applicable to the acceding
countries should in principle be transitional arrange-
ments based on consideration of their spocilic cir-
cumstances and can only be more closely defined
when their rrcspective accessions art negotiated.
Nevertheless, a "critical mass" of "acquis" essential
for accession has to be prrserved in spite of any
flexible arrangement.
Context and Timetable:
Only once the 1996 Conference has reached a
satisfactory conclusion will it be possible for the other
tasks to be tackled on more solid bases, although, the
report underlines that this does not prevent appropri-
ate preparatory work from being carried out at the
same time. The Group therefore considers that the
Conference should start and conclude its proceedings
in good time in order to enable the other important
elements on the schedule to be dealt with properly.
Enlargement is not only a response to the new
challenges facing the Union as mentioned above, it is
also a challenge in itself. An enlargement will also
have a definite impact on Community policies and
give a new dimension to the problem of the Union's
resources. As a result while stressing the need for
enlargement it has to be duly prepared so that it is
successfully achieved.
In response to the questions who?, when? and
how?, the Group attempts to provide answers:
- Who will b€ acceding to the Union when
enlargement takes place? The report believes that
accession should be open to all European countries
which complywith the criteria laid down at the Copen-
hagen European Council. Each case must be dealt
with on its own merits during the negotiations. How-
ever, the aim of the Reflection Group is to identi$ the
reforms desirable and sufficient to enable the Union
to incorporate associated Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries, including the Baltic States, Cyprus
and Malta.
-When? Cyprus andMalta will start six months
after the end of the Conference taking into account its
outcome. However, it is not yet clear from the report
when the negotiations will begin with the Central and
Eastern European countries exactly.
-How? It will have to combine a global ap-
proach to meet common demands with flexible ad-
justment structures which make it possible in each
case to adopt an appropriate time scale for the process
of full incorporation of applicants into the present
Union's common policies.
The report does not deal with the question of
whether and if so how, common policies should be
revised in the light of enlargement as it is not within
the Group's mandate. The Group while agreeing on
the maintenance of the "acquis" underlines that this
should not prevent progressive implementation ofthe
"acquis" by the applicant countries.
The broad majority of the Reflection Group
came out in favour of the separation of the Confer-
ence exercise from the study of the impact of enlarge-
ment in relation to future development of common
policies. The reasons being that:
- firstly, a revision of policies does not require
amendment of their respective legal bases;
- secondly, the effect of enlargement on com-
mon policies will not be immediate but will spread
over time in accordance with the model for enlarge-
ment which in general seems possible for the next set
of applicants;
- finally, it is not appropriate to comblne two
such politically sensitive exercises.
Some members consider that the analysis
for the impact of the enlargement on policies and
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resources should be developed simultaneously with
the IGC. One member stresses that, each of the EU's
major tasks from now until the end of the century are
aspects of the srme overall strategy, the results of
which will be judged with an assessment of all the
efforts, concessions and opportunities involved in the
common project.
What kind of conference?
In the report, the Reflection group gave its
opinion onwhat waythe Conference should go. In its
support for adequate responses to the question of
enlargement the Group stressed that on top was im-
proving the present functioning of the Union, a far
greater number of Member States than was the case
in earlier enlargements. The forthcoming enlarge-
ment will, the report points out, malre the Union
much more heterogeneous than at present as regards
in size of countries, variety of languages, disparity of
income levels and differing sensitivities with regard to
Foreign Policy of Justice and Home Affairs.
The Group has convened that the scope of
the Confertnce should be targeted to deliver the
nocessarl results without opening a general rrvlslon
of the Treaty. A single Conference and not one
with different agendas. The Group considers that
the Conference should confine itself to its own
specific aims, namely realizing the (legal or practical)
reforms to enable the Union to meet the
current challenges facing Europe, continuing and
building on the achievements of Maastricht and
preparing the ground for the forthcoming enlarge-
ment.
The Group emphasizes in its report that by
amending the Treaties and also by improvlng the
Union's procedures and working methods the neces-
sary results can be achieved.
Against this background, the Group without
seeking to limit the Conference's sovereign power,
recommends that results should be achieved in three
main areas:
- Making Europe more relevant to its citizens;
- Enabling the Union to work better and prc-
paring lt for enlargement;
- Givingthe Union greater capacityfor external
action.
COMMISSION OWLINES PNNCIPIES FOR COHESION POLICY AFTER ENIARGE-
MENT
In its communication to the
MadridSummit on "TheEffects of
Enlargement", the European
Commission established 6 leading
principles which should govern the
future cohesion policy. We have
pointed out in the last issue (c.f. No
79, pp 3-4) that the Commission
tries to assure the EU poorer
countries and regions that the
principles of economic and social
cohesion will continue to be the
fundamental feature of a future
EU policy and that, inspite of new
costs linked to the enlargement,
the application of structural and
cohesion funds would not be an
obstacle to the enlargement.
Furthermore, the six prin-
clples try to establish that cohe-
sion policy shall be regarded as an
instrument helping with the en-
largement process and with creat-
ing a balance of interest of the
current and new member states.
1. The objective of strength-
sningthe economicand social cohe-
sion, as laid dovm inArticle B of the
Common Provisions of the EU
Treatycontinues to be a fundamen-
tal element of EU policy.
(We would like to recall that
this part ofthe Treaty asks to pro-
mote economic and social progress,
which is balanced and sustainable,
through the creation of the internal
market, and through the strengthen-
ing of economic and social cohesion,
and through establishment of mone-
tary union ultimately including a
single currency)
2.Therc mustbe a guarantee
for the poorcr member states on the
continuation of solidarity, although
its application should take account
of the success achieved in economic
and social cohesion. The general
application of the cohesion policy
throughout the Union should be
maintained, even if there is aneed to
concentrate funding on specific
regions or policy priorities.
3.Improvement and a revi-
sion of cohesion policy is neces-
sary, as it needs to become more
effective. The Cohesion report
which the Commission will estab'
lish in 1996, will provide a basis for
the review. The reform of cohe-
sion policy within the 15 member
states, which is to follow, should
however, take place in an accept-
able time period.
4. During atime when most
member states are going through
a process of rigorous budget man-
agement in order to maintain or to
fulfil the Maastricht criteria, the
Union should also provide aclear
signal that it shapes its policies in
a way that the principle of budget
discipline is concretely respected.
5. Wrile the obJccdw
should be full applicatlon of
(coniruudange t)
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cohesion policy to new members,
transitional arrangements aftrr
accession will be necessary to inte-
grate them gradually lnto the pol-
lcy and lts linancial aspocts.
6. While implementing the
structural funds in the CEECs, the
economic effectiveness of transfers
must be assured. Experience sug-
gests that volu'nes of assistance
which are hrgh i" relation to the
recipients'GDP are difficult to use
effectively, and can even distort
their economic structure. High
volumes of assistance might pose
big problems for the new member
states, as their administrative sys-
tems, their absorptive capacity and
their ability for co-financing the aid
might be overwhelmed by the inllux
offunds. r
BWGARUNAPPLICATION
Bulgaian Foreign Minister, Georyi Piinski, submitted his country's opplication for EU Membenhip
in Madid on the margin of the EU Summit. Bulgarian President Mr. Zhelev attended the ceremony. The
accession request wcts occompanied by an &page memorandum. Mr. Piinski hoped that the accession
negotiations would sturt soon afterthe conclusion of the IGC. The neptiolioru shouldbegdn simultaneously
wilh oll assuioted countics of catal ud eastem runpe- Bulgaia has waited with the application's
submissionupuntilthe Govemment "obtainedthe cefiaingthatthe country shouldbe able totake afullpat
in accession negotiations" said Bulgaian foreip minister.
Lithunia Applies lu Acceetion to t u EU
Lithuaniawas the last of the Baltic countries to submit on applicationfor aecession to the European
Union. President Algirdos Brazaukas and Prime Minister Adolfos Slezzvicius signed the application on I
December. On the sarne date the President of Parliament signed a parliamentary declaration authoizing this
oct. The declaration was transfened by Foreign Affain Minister Mn Povilas Gylys to the Spanish Presidency
of the EUCouncil. The Pime Ministerupressedthehopethatthe MadridSummitwouldclarifythe timetable
for the beginning of thi accession negotiations.
C-udr opplication h fonuary:
Czech Pime Minister, Voclav Kaus, toldthe EU Heads of State and Govemment in Madid that "I
intend to officially submit the application to Pime Minister Dini duing my official visit to ltaly at the end
oflanuary 1996"
Czech Republic is the last associated country to submit an accession application. In his speech in
Madrid the Czech Prentier said that '9e follow with great interest the fundamental discussions on the
deepening of tlrc economic and monetary aspects of the Union". He pointed to his country's expeience with
the COMECON-nA\e integration and to the fact that his counfiy went in the opposite direction in splittingthe
countty os well as the cunency. He also mentioned the costs of the uniftcation of Germany. Thus the Czech
Republicknows that allimpoftantchangesmustlindbroadpopularsupport andmusttake care of allpotential
costs andbenefits. "In this respect,we wouldbe onthe side of those membercounties of the EUwhich stress
a more gradualistic approach to that" . Europe today is not a case for shock therapy. "The monetary unification
will bing significant benefi* (at non-negligible costs), but the question remains how big the maryin between
costs and benefits will be."
STEELTRADE ISSUE RUPPMRS IN EU-POLISH DULOGUE
There have been certain hints from the EU institutions to Polish authorities to reconsider their apparent
will to get tough with the EU in the field of trade policy. This year was marked by continuous discussions
between Foland and the European Commission regarding the Polish decision to introduce obligatory
certification for imported products. Poland hinted that as a result of the lack of concessions by the EU to
fundamentally improve market access (in particular for agricultural products), and in view of the somewhat
more firm commitment concerning the opening of the enlargement negotiations, it feels free to start using
provisions laid down in the Europe Agreements allowing Poland to restrict, on certain conditions, access of
EU products on the Polish market. It is believed in Brussels that Poland does not intend to carry outthe?-\Vo
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cut in customs duties stipulated for 1996 by the Europe Agreements. Justification may be found in the article
of the Europe Agreement which allows exceptional measures concerning either infant industries or sectors
undergoing restructuring, or facing difficulties.
Poles apparently believe, the steel sector fits this description. As the EU plans to apply a double
checking system of imported steel products to all countries ofcentral and eastern Europe (this system has yet
not yet been applied to Poland and Hungary, but to the rest of east Europe), the introduction by Poland of
approval of all imports via obligatory certification together with maintenance of alTVo import duty on EU
steel products (current level of LZVo plus SVo general import surcharge), could be judged in Poland as an
efficient countermeasure. The EU steel sector and the European Commission are probably even more
concerned by the maintenance of the Polish ban on oxports of scrap. Poland granted an EU quota of only
400,000 tons i.e. less than half of the volume EU steel industry was able to import some 3 years ago. Lack of
scrap is one of the main problems for the EU steel industry.
The Commission reminded Poland that Polish exports of steel to the EU were able to expand rapidly
and that Poland is likely to have steel products trade surplus with the EU of probably lm tons in 1995 as against
470,000 tons in 1994 and 830,000 tons in 193. This year EU steel exports to Poland were only some 2(X),000
tons. Thus the message is that there is no real need to use non-tariffbarriers and to refuse to carry out planned
cuts in steel import duties.
SWEDISH GOWRNMENTTAKES POSITION ON IGCAND ENI./IRGEMENT
The Swedish Government presented on 7
December to the Swedish parliament a report on its
position towards the 1996 Intergovernmental Confer-
ence. The report is in favour of strong European
institutions. Its point is that the attempts to return
issues to the national level in the name of subsidiarity
should be discouraged in all cases when the issues
could be better dealt with at Community level. This,
for example, leads the Swedish Government to re-
quest that the IGC strengthens the EU environment
policyin therevised EU Treaty. One of its proposals
calls for theIGC to introduce the environmental goal
for the Common Agricultural Policy into Article 39.
The case of maintaining a strong and uniform
institutional framework is also emphasized in the
Swedish Government's consideration about the nec-
essary flexibility in the EU. The flexibility is consid-
ered to be necessary for strengthening cooperation in
an enlarged Union, but the condition of the single
institutional framework. The Government is in fa-
vour of a continued role of the European Commis-
sion. Each country has to have the right to appoint one
Commissioner. The Commission shall have the right
to supervise member countries compliance with
agreements within the framework of cooperation on
justice and home affairs (i.e. 3rd. pillar). In the field
of the 3rd Pillar the Swedish Government says that an
eventual transfer of appropriate aspects of asylum
and immigration policy to the first pillar (i.e. to the
Community procedure) might be considered.
On decision-makingprocedure inthe Council
the Government said that in "certain areas the wider
application of qualified majority maybe considered".
Swedes, however, oppose that the weighing of votes of
member countries reflect their population's size. In
principle, Swedes are in favour of continuation of the
rotation ofthe EU Council presidency, but are ready
to consider some other possibilities involving a "team
presidency''.
Enlargement:
The Swedish Government took an important
position on the next enlargement -
1. Negotiations should start at the same time
with all candidate countries andthe SwedishGovern-
ment wants that the earlier decision applied to Malta
and Cyprus i.e. start of the negotiations six months
after the conclusion of IGC is thus applied to central
and east Europe
2. Baltic countries should be treated in the
same way as the other applicants. This shall be con-
sidered as a strong reaction to several recent declara-
tions suggestingthat enlargement negotiationsshould
start firstly with central European countries (Czech
Republic, Poland, Hungary perhaps Slovenia) and
only than with the other candidates from central and
eastern Europe.
3. The linancial burden of enlargement must
be allocated fairly among all Member States
The Swedish Government took a firm position
on several issues which are of strong importance in
the country: democracy, access to information, trans-
parency, employment, workers rights, protection of
(couinued on page 10)
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consumers. Sweden, for example, wants that the
revised Treaty incorporates the principle of public
access to documents of the EU institutions. Record
of Council's proceedings shall be accessible to
the public. The Treaty shall contain a Chapter on
Employment. The Protocol on Social Policy should
be incorporated into the Treaty. The Government
considers proposing Treaty amendments making
it possible to place collective labour market
agreements and legislation on an equal footing where
these agreements enjoy a legal force on a national
basis. Consumer protection should be one of
the major goals of the Union and this should be
reflected in the Treaty which should indicate clearly
that consumers are afforded protection of their legal
interests.
Defence and Foreign Policy:
The position of a common foreign and defence
policy reiterates the traditional Sweden's stand with
certain new elements. Thus the abolishment of the
right of veto is out of the question, but Sweden seems
to be ready to consider the modification of the prin-
ciple of unanimity on some specific questions. The
Government is prepared to participate actively in the
second pillar including defence, but chiefly defence
taken in the sense of strengthening of peacekeeping
instruments. On the other hand, Sweden is not in
favour of becoming a member of the WEU. This is
because of the mutual security guarantees contained
in the Brussels Treaty. Thus, Sweden may participate
in peacekeeping, but not in mutual guarantees among
the member states.
DANISH MEMOMNDUM ON IGCAND ENI.ARGEMENT
The draft Danish memorandum on the IGC was irt favour of a furlher revision of the EU Treaty and
established a number of Danish pioities:
- 
the pincipal goal of the revision of the Maasticht Treaty shall be the peparution fu ailogmat
to tlu east and the Baltic states
- 
a revised Treaty slnuld give pioity to the ight of citizcns, a speciJic Chapter on Employment and
on igltts of workerc, there shouldbe a strenglhened common position on environment includingpossibly a
protocol deteminingwhich envfuorunentaltucs cotrldbeadopenbyqnlifrcdrnaioilyvote intluCsurcil
The memorandum shows a good will towards a contnton foreign and secuity policy and sugests that
the member counties shall have the ight to decide on a common action even if one or two states would vote
against. Concemingthe institutions, the memorandum considers the possibilig of several member counties
shaing the Cowtcil presidency. Weighing of votes in the Council could be linked to the size of a member
country population, but considers respect the pinciple that balance between small and larye counties is not
changed in the revised Treaty.
BELGIUM'S POSITION ON IGCAND ENI./IRGEMENT
The Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene re-confirmed in his pre-Madrid declaration in the
Belgian Parliament on European policy that the issue of enlargement for Belgium (and other Benelux
countries as well) continues to be directly linked to the "deepening" of the European Union. EMU's
Maastricht criteria and timetable must be respected, he said, otherwise "it will be a vacuum". His reasoning
was that this deepening of the integration within the Union is the keybecause without the deepening and in
view of increasingly strong pressures on enlargement, the EU would change into a vast free-trade area, which
would encourage the temptation to use devaluation as an instrument of economic policy. "This would kill the
Single market,lead to the domination of the DM and create frustrationswhichwouldbringEurope to the edge
of the abyss".
On the same date the Belgian parliament's Opinion Committee on European market was considering
the amendments tabled by Anne-MarieLizin (former Member of European Parliament and former Belgian
Minister for European Affairs) to the Parliament's draft report on IGC. Anne-Marie Lizin demanded that
the IGC is suspended if it would become clear that deepening of the Union is not possible. !
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CUSTOMS UNION WTTH TARKET
The European Parliament
gave its assent on 13 December to a
Customs Union with Turkey. The
Commission urged the EP to give its
assent. It asked the parliament to
consider the agreement's economic
benefits for the European Union.
Its "dossier" pointed to the prog-
ress made by Turkey to bolster
democracy and the rule of law and
to appreciable economic advan-
tages that the EU will draw from
implementation of the Customs
Union Decision on the scheduled
date i.e. l January 196. The Com-
mission's paper stated that rejec-
tion of the Customs Union Decision
would create a highly complexlegal
situation which would be deleteri
ous to EU interests. The favorable
decisionwould culminate the proc-
ess that started in LW with the
signing of the Ankara Agreement
and was corroborated in 1997 with
the entry into force of the Addi-
tional Protocol. The principle of the
progressive setting-up of the Cus-
toms Union over a period of 22
years is enshrined in those texts and
is legally binding.
The Customs Union should
start operating on l January 196.
The EU-Turkey Association Coun-
cil meeting on 30 October 1995
conlirmed that Turkey had met the
conditions. The following article
looks into the major economic and
trade issues and outlines the advan-
tages for the EU which were under-
lined by the Commission.
The EU has already largely
dismantled customs duties and,
excepting textiles, abolished all
quantitative restrictions. Thus the
bulk of the effort in the final phase
is to be made by Turkey which
agreed to dismantle its customs
tariffs vis-a-vis the Community on
the entry ofthe Customs Union into
force. The impact of this move is
clear from the fact that the current
customs protection for Turkish
industrial products is l4Vo onaver-
age with peaks in certain sectors
ranging from 20 to 40Vo.
Turkey is the EU's tenth
biggest trading partner and fore-
most trading partner in the Medi-
terranean.
The complete dismantling
of customs tariffs in Turkey will
further improve the market possi-
bilities for EU companies. It will
strengthen direct investment and
joint ventures with Turkish forms
and will give the EU companies
better access to Central Asia.
Textiles
In return for scrapingvolun-
tary restraint agreements (which
were due to lapse as a result ofthe
Uruguay Round anyvay) the EU
obtained an undertaking from
Turkey that the countrywill comply
with EU textile policy in its entirety
(commercial policy and aids). The
EU gains favorable terms of access
to the Turkish market, while EU
access of products from low-wage
country will continue to be subject
to control.
Yehicles
There are special advan-
tages because Turkey is to main-
tain towards Third Countries cus-
toms tariffs which are higher than
theEU common custom tariff (for
vehicles under 3 litres). This will
give vehicles produced in Turkey in
joint ventureswith EU companies,
or to vehicles exported from the
EU a substantial preferential mar-
gin over other third countries.
Turkey agreed to monitor imports
ofJapanese cars.
Intellectual property
The implementation of a
Customs Union forces Turkey to
align its legislation and practice on
those of the EU well before the
commitments on intellectual
property right accepted byTurkey
in the Uruguay Round.
Competition
Turkey agreed to align its
competition laws on EU legisla-
tion fully and to have them en-
forced by a body lndependent of
the Turkish governmenl Still the
EU reserves the possibility of
deploying when necessary, its
anti-dumping and anti-subsidy
measures.
Standards
All EU industrial products
which conform to European direc-
tives and legislation may enter
Turkey subject only to the condi-
tions governing movement of
goods in the EU. Turkish products
maymove withintheir EU market
on the same terms in step with the
Turkey's adoption of the acquis
communautaire for individual
products.
Commercial policy
Turkeyshall applythe prin-
ciple of coordinating its commer-
cial policy with EU to achieve a
uniform commercial policy. In
order to avoid any trade deflec-
tion, Turkey has undertaken, at
the end of a five year transition
period, to fully align itself on the
Community policy of preferences.
This, for example, means the
alignment to tariff concession
granted to the associated coun-
tries of central and eastern Eu-
rope.
Agriculture
The agricultural products
are not involved even if the origi-
nal agreement stipulated that the
customs union would apply to
(couinued on page 12)
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agriculturd products once the As-
sociation Council had ascertained
that Turkey had adopted the agri-
culturd measures (adaptation to
the CAP). The Decision on Cus-
toms union put the date for attain-
ing free trade back ten years.
Meanwhile there is a requirement
to negotiate reciprocal concessions
that are mutually advantageous.
Steel products
There will be separate ne-
gotiations whose aim from the EU
side shall be an improved access to
the Turkish steel products market
and the possibility to monitor
state aids granted by Turkey in this
sector. Negotiations shall start
soon.
Movement of labour, social issues
The EU requested and
achieved a postponement of dis-
cussion on those issues as it is not
yet ready to extend to Turkey pro-
visions on the free movement of
labour, working conditions, em-
ployment or social entitlement of
Turkish workers in the EU. Turkey
accepted to postpone discussions
albeit with great reluctance. r
ENERGY COUNCIL POST-
PONED.QWSflONSONMAR-
KET LIBERAI-IUTION
The EU Energy Council
meeting scheduled for L4 De-
cember was postponed until 20
December because of continued
differences over the liberali-
zation of the EU electricity
market and third party access.
The issue is expected to be
examined j bf the Heads of
State and Government at the
Madrid Summit and a new
compromise worked out. Com-
missioner Christos Papoutis,
responsible for energy policy,
said on 12 December that the
Commission's proposal stays
on the table, and that the Com-
mission has no intention of
presenting a new proposal.
However, the Commissioner also
said the Commission understands
and takes into account the political
and social sensitivities of the
Member States linked to comple-
tion of the internal electricity
market.
"Together in Europe"
pointed out in June (c.f. No 71)
that the EU Energ5r Council
had reached an important com-
promise at the beginning of June
on the future liberalization of the
EU single electricity market and
that there is a good chance that
there could be a final break-
through on the future directive by
the end of this year. The issue of the
liberalization of the EU electricity
market has been deadlocked in
the Council for the last three
years. The most controversial
aspect has been third party access
to networks.
Readers will recall that
a compromise suggested that
negotiated third party access to
networks and the single-buyer
model could coexist. France
favoured the single-buyer model,
but accepted the compromise
which in turn required finding
solutions to a number 9f practical
problems. Under the single-buyer
system, "eligible consumers"
would themselves be able to
negotiate supply contracts abroad,
while producers who are not
bound by contract to the single
buyer would be able to export
their electricity via the single
buyer network (providing there
is free transport capacity and
it is technically possible). One
of the unresolved problems was the
definition of "eligible consu-
mers", i.e. whether distributors
should be accepted as eligible
consumers or not.
The relatively weak Spa-
nish Presidency compromise
provided for an 8-year transi-
tion period during which distri-
butors would gradually be
included. France rejected the
inclusion of distributors among
the eligible oonsumers authorized
to negotiate directly with produc-
ers. In viewofthe current upheaval
in the French public sector, it
was suspected even before the
decision was taken on the
postponement of the meeting
that the French minister would
have political difficulties suppor-
ting the compromise. r
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